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“Any day now,” says the teacher in Benh Zeitlin’s 2012 film, Beasts of the 
Southern Wild, “fabric of the universe is coming unraveled. Ice caps gonna 
melt, water’s gonna rise, and everything south of the levee is going under. 
Y’all better learn how to survive now.” The film poses a nearly unthink-
able, yet all too present, question: how does one prepare a small child for a 
future marked by imminent environmental collapse? The scene of impos-
sible pedagogy stages the paradoxical relation between the child, so widely 
theorized as the sign of futurity, and her place at what Bill McKibben has 
called “the end of nature” (Edelman 2004; Stockton 2009; Sheldon 2013; 
McKibben 1989). In this essay, I wish to suggest that innocence, as a tem-
poral structure and as a form of absence, deeply informs environmental 
representation, causing it to make special claims on the figure of the child. 
I am especially concerned to illuminate the negative or nonpresent dimen-
sions of innocence and their affordances for the psychic apprehension of 
environmental harm. As Anne-Lise François has observed, the privileged 
environmental figure is precisely one of nonimpact, of leaving no trace—a 
figure of environmental innocence bound up in Romantic childhood 
that the literature of environmental advocacy works to disallow, asserting 
instead, and in the face of what François has identified as nature’s “with-
held response” to violence, a call to responsibility (2014, 6). Environ-
mental genres work to expose environmental innocence—a nonculpable 
earliness or having-time—as a fiction to be strongly countered by a sense 
of urgency (in reality, we’re out of time). Building on Robin Bernstein’s 
analysis of “racial innocence,” I suggest that such efforts rest on racialized 
temporalities of both anticipation (not-yet) and foreclosure (already-
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over). Environmental innocence plays out against a long-standing shadow 
drama of specifically environmental black culpability seated in the figure 
of the black child. I am especially concerned to illuminate the negative or 
nonpresent dimensions of innocence and their affordances for the psychic 
apprehension of environmental harm. I take Beasts of the Southern Wild 
as an exemplary object for illuminating the deep interchanges between 
environmental innocence and racial innocence by situating it in a longer 
trajectory of stagings of black childhood, from the William Blake poem 
cited in the film’s title to Audre Lorde’s Zami: A New Spelling of My Name. 
Beasts of the Southern Wild, filmed in the midst of the ongoing Deepwa-
ter Horizon oil spill cleanup, is a self-consciously post–Hurricane Katrina 
environmental narrative set on an outlying Louisiana island that Zeitlin 
has described as “literally forgotten by the system” (Mohney 2012; Gal-
lot 2012). Through the subjective centering of a very young child, Hush-
puppy (Quevenzhané Wallis), the film seeks to render visualizable what 
Rob Nixon has called the unspectacularizable—indeed, almost impercep-
tible—“slow violence” of environmental destruction. Why is a child’s sub-
jectivity the key to this visualization? And why must that child be a black 
girl who is frequently conspicuously misidentified by both age and gen-
der? I wish to suggest that the film’s temporalities of innocence, realized 
formally through the adoption of Hushpuppy’s fantastical consciousness, 
depend on a racialized logic of childhood—a logic that the film attempts to 
transcend but ultimately only reinscribes. Yet this is not a one-way street: 
the film’s logic also opens out for us the environmental forms already pres-
ent in conceptions of racial innocence, revealing wider consequences for 
environmental genres and the representation of slow violence.
Temporalities of Innocence
From the concept of the “Anthropocene,” the geological period of humans’ 
mark upon the earth, to its calls to urgent action, environmental dis-
courses are deeply implicated in negotiations of time—too much time to 
comprehend, too little time in which to act (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill 
2007; Nixon 2011, 12). Indeed, as Nixon has influentially argued, difficult 
temporalities are the fundamental representational challenge for environ-
mental genres. Because the “slow violence” of environmental destruction 
“occurs gradually and out of sight . . . dispersed across time and space,” it 
is (wrongly) “typically not viewed as violence at all” (Nixon 2011, 2). For 
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Nixon, then, this “slow violence” poses a representational problem, insofar 
as its effects are frequently imperceptible on an individual human scale. 
In naming this representational difficulty, Nixon links temporality to 
one of the central tropes of environmental discourse, that of innocence 
and responsibility. For slow violence is an inhuman process “starring 
nobody” precisely because the diffuse and long-term causes of environ-
mental harm can be ascribed to no one in particular (3). Even the naming 
of specific obviously responsible parties—Exxon, British Petroleum, Mon-
santo—all too plainly fails to capture the systemic, unevenly distributed 
and often only passively agential sources of environmental harm, which 
are now often attributed to that tentative category “the human.” Environ-
mental innocence is a misapprehension of time that directs responsibility 
nowhere and everywhere. Consequently, as Margaret Ronda (2013) has 
pointed out, environmental discourses are conventionally routed through 
temporalities that dispel innocence, the “not-yet” of the environmental 
jeremiad (act now before it’s too late!) and the “already-over” of the envi-
ronmental elegy. In each case, temporality is instrumental in disallowing 
environmental innocence: both urgencies reveal innocence as a false belief 
in having time, to be supplanted by the environmental text’s call to present 
responsibility for either past or future. “Our” belatedness trumps inno-
cence’s temporal priority, its earliness.
Beasts of the Southern Wild explicitly aims to visualize slow violence. In 
the film, Hushpuppy, a child of about four, lives with her erratic, terminally 
ill father, Wink, in a bayou community called the Bathtub, in a precari-
ous environment of natural beauty beyond the mainland’s fortified levees. 
Hushpuppy’s mother, meanwhile, is absent, but continually invoked, 
especially by Hushpuppy. From the film’s opening sequence, with rushing 
storm winds buffeting a teetering building, the Bathtub’s vulnerability to 
imminent natural disaster is made clear. Having established early on that 
ferocious primordial beasts called aurochs lie preserved in polar ice, the 
film, filtered through Hushpuppy’s consciousness, visualizes the inevitable 
storm and its aftermath as an event that is global in scale yet narratable and 
deeply tethered not only to the local but also to the personal: as the storm 
and its devastation progress, and Wink’s illness worsens, the ice caps melt, 
the monstrous aurochs are released, and they approach the Bathtub. By 
the film’s end, with her father dead and her community devastated, Hush-
puppy claims responsibility for the devastation embodied by the aurochs 
and manifested in the land, and for her whole community’s future. “I’ve 
166 Natalia Cecire
gotta take care of mine,” she tells a newly subdued aurochs near the end of 
the film, in a visual tableau that emphasizes her physical smallness before 
the monsters. By adopting (or rather, producing) Hushpuppy’s subjec-
tive centering, the film brings the temporal dispersal of slow violence to 
human scale and, at the same time, successfully supplants environmental 
innocence with responsibility. Hushpuppy’s innocence (in the sense of 
a legitimate irresponsibility) is thus displaced from the character to the 
film’s representational strategies.
Yet by making a black child the figure on which the spectacularization 
of slow violence depends, Beasts shows why environmental innocence—
and the representational goal of its refusal—is more complex than it might 
at first seem. As Robin Bernstein has so deftly shown, the assigning of 
responsibility to a black child is overdetermined (2011). In unpacking 
these dimensions of environmental innocence in Beasts of the Southern 
Wild, I do not simply wish to reiterate bell hooks’s critique that “in the 
mind of white supremacy black children no matter their age are always 
seen as miniature adults,” although I am sympathetic to this critique 
(2012). Nor, for that matter, do I propose that innocence is an unqualified 
good, or that it is necessarily proper to childhood per se. Queer theory and 
childhood studies have usefully complicated innocence and revealed its 
capacity to stifle, delay, disempower, and serve as a site of predatory adult 
overinvestment (Stockton 2009; Kincaid 1998). Instead, I wish to track 
how the allocation and denial of innocence in environmental representa-
tion dovetails with already fraught allocations of child innocence. Beasts’s 
very representational successes, I wish to suggest, reveal the double binds 
already built into the temporalities of environmental innocence. 
Gerry Canavan’s critique of the environmental jeremiad in children’s 
media—“The incessant refrain of the animated Captain Planet series that 
‘The power is yours!’” he observes, “is on some level completely ridicu-
lous”—points to the problem: of course children cause harm, but are they 
culpable for it (2013, 4)? Is there no exemption available for the specific 
kind of unknowing harm that a child might inflict, when, as Canavan 
rightly points out, the child in reality “controls almost no aspect of her 
own surroundings, much less exerts any kind of society-wide influence” 
(4)? In ecological terms, of course, the answer is that no such exemption 
exists: the plastic diaper (or, more pertinently, the broader complex of eco-
logically destructive postindustrial capitalism in which the child is embed-
ded) causes harm no matter how unknowing the child is. But the terms 
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of ecopoiesis are social and need not be so absolute: law and ethics rou-
tinely allow the different valences of childhood’s stipulated “innocence” 
to overlap. 
Indeed, literature and culture already make a space for sanctioned 
and, as it were, innocent destruction: the space of fantasy, whose privi-
leged form is the child’s playing.1 As François has argued, such playing has 
emerged in environmental policy debates as an appropriable figure for 
quite adult and quite culpable bodies like British Petroleum: the “meta-
phor of shadow-boxing or throwing punches at the air usefully describes 
the double impotence and impunity of the actors involved” in the Deep-
water Horizon oil spill (in whose aftermath Beasts of the Southern Wild 
was filmed) (François 2014, 4; Mohney 2012). You’re doing harm, but 
it doesn’t matter (your infantile omnipotence is not real); you’re doing 
harm, but you can’t help it (in reality you are powerless to do anything 
else). Moreover, such playing may have a specifically ecological use: the 
“sense of infallibility” built into playing “may be a way of registering the 
eeriness of a violence so deferred and abstracted [that] its most common 
manifestation is [an] immunity from direct contact” (François 2014, 5). 
The representational problem of slow violence, in these terms, is perhaps 
only visualizable in the mode of provisional inconsequence—that of what 
François calls “shadow-boxing,” or, in generic terms, of fantasy. This is the 
approach that Zeitlin takes in Beasts, building visual sequences whose fan-
tastic, magical logic yokes local ruin to global ruin and weather to climate. 
The affordances of innocence or legitimate irresponsibility, though cen-
tered on Hushpuppy, are projected out from her into the film’s diegesis, to 
be taken up by viewers. Exceptions to environmental representation’s call 
to responsibility, realized through shadowboxing and fantasy, are portable 
away from the child in whose name they may be evoked.
Racial Innocence, Time, and Environment
As I noted above, innocence, as one of environmental representation’s key 
sites of contestation, is racialized, overdetermining Hushpuppy’s assump-
tion of responsibility in Beasts of the Southern Wild. As Bernstein has 
detailed in Racial Innocence, the construction of the black child as imper-
vious to harm, and therefore excluded from innocence’s claims to protec-
tion, has a long and insidious history whose legacy includes the racialized 
“school-to-prison pipeline” and the criminalization of black youth (Ber-
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nstein 2011; Simmons 2009; Kim, Losen, and Hewitt 2010; Goff et al. 
2014). Yet this overdetermination is not merely grounds for reproaching 
the film’s politics (although it may serve that function as well), for if, as I 
have already suggested, environmental innocence is implicitly racialized, 
attending to temporality discloses how racial innocence is already implic-
itly environmental. 
Innocence is a matter of absence, what James Kincaid calls “a set of 
have nots”: the absence of knowledge, of experience, of culpability (legal 
or moral), or of guilt, and their equal capacity to rupture innocence means 
that putting innocence at stake renders each of them substitutable for 
any of the others (Kincaid 1998, 15; Stockton 2009, 12).2 As Bernstein 
has argued, innocence is not just a quality residing in bodies or subjects, 
but something that has to be actively performed and reinforced through 
the repudiation of social categories like race, class, and gender (2011, 6). 
The sanctioned unknowing of innocence only confers its favors on those 
whose unmarked bodies can effectively shut those categories out. 
Precisely because of its negative definition, innocence is constituted 
as temporally prior, whether to knowledge, to experience, or to culpable 
action. “Marked” bodies, as Bernstein suggests, are rarely innocent ones. 
I wish to insist on this past participle, “marked,” which grammatically for-
malizes the time past: in the case of blackness in particular, “markedness” 
(in the linguistic sense of being conventionally taken as nonstandard) is 
conceptualized as having been marked, as being experienced and belated, 
not early. The just-so story of blackness—as if requiring explanation—
takes whiteness as an originary state and blackness as somehow acquired 
by experience—thus antithetical, in that sense, to innocence. Moreover, 
that experience is conventionally troped as an environmental one. As a 
famous verse from the Song of Songs goes, “I am black but comely. .  .  . 
Do not look upon me [disdainfully] because I am swarthy, for the sun has 
gazed upon me” ( Jewish Publication Society 1985, Song of Songs 1:5–6). 
The temporality of racial innocence thus already participates in the 
forms of environmental innocence, especially in the archaic troping of 
blackness as a form of sunburn, in which marking is effected by envi-
ronmental exposure. As Kathryn Bond Stockton has pointed out, this 
dynamic is shatteringly illustrated in the William Blake poem “The Little 
Black Boy,” which the title Beasts of the Southern Wild obliquely cites: 
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My mother bore me in the southern wild, 
And I am black, but O! my soul is white; 
White as an angel is the English child: 
But I am black as if bereav’d of light. 
(Blake 2003)
The poem powerfully instantiates not only the racialization of innocence 
but also the environmentalization of race. The titular little black boy 
assumes responsibility for sheltering the fair-skinned English boy from the 
strong rays of divine presence “till he can bear, / To lean in joy upon our 
fathers knee” (Blake 2003). Stockton, in an incisive reading of this poem, 
argues that the little black boy is “queered by race”: queered in the sense 
that the time of his childhood is distanced from itself; he is always more 
mature and more seasoned than his supposed contemporary, the white boy, 
because of his blackness. Thus the black child’s melanin is made a virtue 
precisely insofar as it enables him to withstand divine harm and to absorb 
it in the English boy’s stead: a strange virtue, for, his dark skin explained as 
“sun-burnt,” the black boy’s exposure to divine harm is rewarded only with 
more such harm, and a responsibility to shelter the unharmed white boy. 
As Stockton notes, this song of innocence has no counterpart among the 
“songs of experience” because it is already about an innocence preempted 
by experience (2009, 32). 
While Blake’s poem, which is the most explicit intertext for Beasts of 
the Southern Wild, is exemplary of the environmental significance of the 
already-over destruction of black innocence, the trope appears more subtly 
elsewhere, as well. Bernstein’s own account of “racial innocence” borrows 
an exemplary pair of contrasting images of children in cotton fields—a 
happy black child on a trade card and a miserable white child in a Lewis 
Hine photograph—which once again frames the black child’s alleged 
imperviousness to harm in environmental terms (2011, 30–33). And in a 
different register and a different historical moment, in an early scene in her 
autobiography Zami: A New Spelling of My Name, Audre Lorde offers an 
account of what I am tempted to call the racial “climate” of her childhood: 
As a very little girl, I remember shrinking from a particular sound, a 
hoarsely sharp, guttural rasp, because it often meant a nasty glob of grey 
spittle upon my coat or shoe an instant later. My mother . . . fussed about 
low-class people who had no better sense nor manners than to spit into 
the wind no matter where they went, impressing upon me that this 
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humiliation was totally random. It never occurred to me to doubt her. 
It was not until years later once in conversation I said to her: “Have 
you noticed people don’t spit into the wind so much the way they used 
to?” And the look on my mother’s face told me that I had blundered into 
one of those secret places of pain that must never be spoken of again. 
(1982, 17–18)
The belatedness with which Lorde apprehends the racial character of 
the memory recapitulates the already-over structure of black innocence: 
though the mother touchingly preserves her daughter’s innocence by 
absorbing “pain” on her daughter’s behalf, the revelation and its attendant 
sense of culpability are only deferred (18). The daughter finds that she has 
culpably “blundered” in finding out that the precipitation that seemed to 
come with the randomness of weather (the wind) was always the most 
literal and explicitly targeted racism.
As Ulrich Beck notes, “Given that many [especially environmental] 
threats lack any sensory character, the only way that culturally blinded 
daily life can become ‘sighted’ is through culturally meaningful and pub-
licly exhibited images and symbols” (1995, 3).3 Punctual scenes of racial 
revelation in African American writing—notable not only in Lorde but 
also in James Weldon Johnson’s Autobiography of an Ex-coloured Man, 
Zora Neale Hurston’s Their Eyes Were Watching God, and Countee Cullen’s 
“Incident”—render the black child an available figure for visualizing the 
systemic violence of racism, often in explicitly environmental terms (Ber-
nstein 2011, 2). It is thus no accident, as Bernstein has argued, that Brown 
v. Board of Education turned on the famous “doll test,” which produced 
scenes of black children crying (2011, 240). The punctual production of 
tears from the black child’s body was the tableau through which an ambi-
ence—“intangible” harm—could be registered (Cheng 2000, 4).
Visualizing Slow Violence
While Lorde, Johnson, and Hurston represent racial revelation’s double 
bereavement (“I am not and I never was”) in order to expose the injuries 
done to black childhood, Beasts mobilizes it in the service of environmen-
tal representation. The film suggests from the beginning its post-Katrina 
awareness—which Zeitlin has noted in interviews—of the differential 
distribution of environmental culpability and environmental harm, starkly 
contrasting the goldenly lit Bathtub with shots of a mainland covered in 
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industrial smokestacks (Gallot 2012). Hushpuppy’s voiceover continues 
the contrast in the film’s introduction: 
Daddy says, up above the levee, on the dry side, they’re afraid of the 
water like a bunch of babies. They built the wall that cuts us off. They 
think we all gonna drown down here. But we ain’t going nowhere. .  .  . 
Daddy’s always saying that up on the dry world, they’ve got none of 
what we’ve got. .  .  . They got fish stuck in plastic wrappers; they got 
their babies stuck in carriages. And chicken on sticks and all that kind 
of stuff. One day, the storm’s gonna blow, the ground’s gonna sink, and 
the water’s gonna rise up so high there ain’t gonna be no Bathtub. Just a 
whole bunch of water.
The contrast is explicit: the mainland pollutes, with its plastic wrappers 
and its chicken on sticks, but it is the Bathtub that will pay. The Bath-
tub and the mainland to the north thus reproduce in miniature the real 
environmental relations of the global South to the global North, with the 
global North’s consumption disproportionately affecting the global South.
Yet even in introducing this disparate relation, the film already mobi-
lizes the racialized logic of environmental innocence: Hushpuppy alludes 
to the mainlanders as “a bunch of babies” with the utmost disdain, project-
ing onto them a protected status that she would not herself claim, despite 
(and unlike the mainlanders) her literally being a child. Babies (like Hush-
puppy) don’t need any protection, the film suggests, and neither does the 
Bathtub, even though its destruction by environmental catastrophe is the 
centerpiece of the film.
It is with the racial logic of environmental innocence already in place 
that Beasts of the Southern Wild aims to render slow violence representable, 
borrowing the African American strategy of producing punctual scenes 
that collapse and compress the temporal and spatial extension of harm. 
In the film, this is established through the titular beasts, whose release 
from the melting prehistoric polar ice cap marks both an irrevocable 
environmental catastrophe and the setting of the film’s action within geo-
logic time. Crucially, their release is tied to a punctual scene of revelation, 
during a fight between Hushpuppy and her terminally ill father, who slaps 
her to the ground and yells at her. “I hope you die,” Hushpuppy returns in 
anger and strikes her father on the chest. 
The film represents Hushpuppy’s retaliation as infinitely significant 
within the film’s fantastic register, as her wish appears to become reality 
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(Freud 1955, 247–48). For a moment after she strikes her father, he stands 
silently, as the film’s audio fills with a rushing heartbeat and the rumble 
of what sounds like thunder. Hushpuppy looks up at the sky, hearing the 
thunder, before Wink, who has recently returned from a hospital visit, falls 
to the ground. Frightened, Hushpuppy looks up again in the direction of 
the rumbling, which crashes more loudly. The film then cuts to footage of 
polar ice crumbling into the sea, while the continuity of audio as the film 
cuts back and forth between Hushpuppy’s panicked running through the 
woods and the crashing ice links Wink’s fall, the local storm, and the global 
disaster of climate change to Hushpuppy’s scene of culpability. Standing 
in the rising waters, Hushpuppy yells to her long-absent mother: “Mama, 
I think I broke something!” taking responsibility for the telescoping range 
of catastrophes.
The film lets us see—of course—that Hushpuppy is not really responsi-
ble for her father’s illness or for global climate change; instead, quasi-magi-
cal coincidence produces the effect of that responsibility: over the course of 
the film, alongside the storm’s indelible aftereffects, we are shown polar ice 
melting and the aurochs floating in chunks of ice, eventually making their 
way toward the Bathtub. It is an effect in which Hushpuppy fully believes. 
This coincidence, and especially the visual and aural relay between Wink’s 
fall, the local storm, and the global consequences of climate change ren-
ders slow violence representable precisely through a scene of black child 
innocence denied—what I have suggested is an already available, conven-
tional device for making slow violence available for representation. That 
trope of racial violence is already conventionally environmental, just as, 
as Nixon points out and as Zeitlin, in Beasts, seems to wish to emphasize, 
the slow violence of environmental harm is frequently racial in its effects. 
Yet the film also seems to naturalize the symbolic burdens placed upon 
Hushpuppy, forcing her to accept responsibility for the catastrophe she 
did not make. Later in the film, after the storm has passed but its effects, in 
the form of flooding, have remained, Hushpuppy calls again to her absent 
mother. “Mama, is that you? I’ve broken everything.” 
Indeed, the film brutally withholds relief for Hushpuppy’s sense of 
responsibility, with Wink persistently calling her a “man” and forbidding 
crying even as he dies. Even when Hushpuppy and some other girls from 
the Bathtub go off in search of her mother, the mother surrogate who makes 
her fried gator—echoing a story Wink has told about her real mother 
making fried gator—only does so while delivering a speech about self- 
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sufficiency.4 The woman is not the “Mama” to whom Hushpuppy calls out 
her confessions of culpability, someone who could perhaps take respon-
sibility in Hushpuppy’s stead: the woman refuses to go back with Hush-
puppy to care for Wink, and so Hushpuppy returns to stare down the 
geologically scaled beasts that embody environmental harm, in a climactic 
profile shot staged to mark the difference between the beasts’ massive bod-
ies and her very small one. 
In Beasts, fantasy takes up the role of shadowboxing, allowing the die-
gesis to inhabit Hushpuppy’s worldview while also marking that world-
view as provisional (indeed—because belonging to a child—temporary). 
Crucially, the portrayal of fantasy in Beasts of the Southern Wild depends 
entirely on Hushpuppy and her way of seeing the world, from the magical 
causality of her fight with Wink to the beasts to the Romantic commu-
nion with nature with which the film opens: dust motes glinting in the sun, 
Hushpuppy holds a bird up to her ear and feels the pulse of a pig, saying, 
“All the time, everywhere, everything’s hearts are beating and screaming 
and talking to each other in ways I can’t understand.” It is with the same 
sense of communion that she—and we—hear Wink’s heart stop beating 
at the end of the film. Her developmental earliness, her not-yet status, are 
what make fantasy a possible space for the film, just as her blackness pro-
vides the overdetermined grounds of an environmental innocence fore-
closed. For Ronda and Nixon, foreclosing environmental innocence and 
assuming responsibility is an elusive goal of environmental representation, 
one that Timothy Morton has proposed in deconstructive terms as a “dark 
ecology” of “want[ing] to stay with a dying world,” and of “recogniz[ing] 
that we did it, we caused environmental destruction. . . . We imagine our 
own death via nature” (2007, 185).
Beasts of the Southern Wild seems much in line with these ecological 
critiques and, in all too successfully realizing their politics of responsibil-
ity, reveals their limits. Morton somewhat playfully calls his “dark ecology” 
“goth,” but the darkness on which Beasts relies is not goth but racial, and 
it has a history. The beasts are fantastic—markedly so, but the ecological 
devastation for which they serve as a figure remains fatally real. 
Even if audiences are reassured, not so much by events in the film as 
by a generic understanding of fantasy, of her innocence, Hushpuppy her-
self never is. Indeed, Hushpuppy seems unnervingly to embrace the “dark 
ecology” that Morton proposes, insisting (like her father) on “stay[ing] 
with a dying world”—“We ain’t going nowhere,” she says—and even imag-
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ining her own death. Indeed, this is how the film closes, after Hushpuppy 
sends her dead father off on a floating pyre. Hushpuppy reprises a senti-
ment she has already expressed once before: “When I die, the scientists of 
the future, they’re going to find it all. They’re going to know. Once there 
was a Hushpuppy, and she lived with her daddy in the Bathtub.” As she and 
the remaining denizens of the Bathtub walk toward the camera along a wet 
shore, the camera zooms away from them, allowing their figures to grow 
smaller and smaller, as if hurtling the audience into the future and leaving 
Hushpuppy and the Bathtub behind. It is telling that Hushpuppy intends 
for her mark on the world to be found by “scientists,” not historians: con-
tinuity and record keeping cannot be assumed; what remains of her may 
be bones or less. Fantasy allows audiences to view the film in a provisional 
way, but Hushpuppy, as far as she knows, remains culpable and responsi-
ble. The music of the film’s closing reinforces the burdening of Hushpuppy 
with diegetic responsibility: as the camera draws away from the shrinking 
people, the music builds tensely, lingering on dissonance before returning 
to the film’s familiar theme precisely as the Bathtub disappears and the 
credits begin to roll. Resolution is extradiegetic. Thus Morton’s account of 
a dark ecology may also serve as a summary of the film’s ending: “We fear 
that we will go on living, while the environment disappears around us. . . . 
It is worse than losing our mother” (2007, 186). 
Meat/Petroleum
Beasts’s push into dark ecology and beyond human life spans brings into 
relief the film’s repeated essays into a posthuman reframing of questions of 
innocence and responsibility. This suggests a different reading of the film 
from the one I have just advanced, one that, in particular, may deflect inno-
cence’s overdetermined racial politics. This account proposes an alternate 
form of environmental address, one potentially less bound to negotiating 
the temporal foldings-over of the jeremiad and the elegy. Such refram-
ings cast the fantastic mode of Hushpuppy’s communion with the natural 
world as epic and redemptive, and throw into question the very possibility 
of responsibility or innocence when, as Miss Bathsheeba puts it, “Meat. 
Meat, meat meat. Every animal is made out of meat. . . . Everything is part 
of the buffet of the universe.” In an early throwaway line that confirms this 
view, Wink gives Hushpuppy (herself named after a side dish) food—
meat—and adds, “Share with the dog.” The people of the Bathtub com-
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munity seem to embrace their status as “meat” for monstrous beasts and, 
indeed, as “beasts,” as when, at a funeral celebration, Hushpuppy begins to 
eat a crab and first Wink, then all present, demand that she “beast it”—tear 
it apart with her hands and mouth. When Hushpuppy finally acknowl-
edges a tentative kinship with the aurochs—“You’re my friend, kind of ”—
she yokes this kinship to her responsibility to the Bathtub: “I’ve gotta take 
care of mine.” The film thus proposes Hushpuppy as a beast-affiliated post-
human hero who can shoulder responsibility for the land less by renounc-
ing innocence than by negating its all too human terms. 
Hushpuppy’s potential posthuman status recasts her earliness (her 
youth) in another way, turning her into a primordial figure who com-
munes with, and is possible food for, the ancient aurochs, and who, in her 
final monologue, places herself in relation to a distant future. The film’s 
ending, with its triumphant music, can fairly be read as an apotheosis, as 
Hushpuppy buries herself in a future ancient history to be discovered by 
“the scientists of the future.” Yet as Stephanie LeMenager has observed, 
“The sacred is invoked when social death has already occurred, and civil 
rights suspended,” and the curiously primordial (not to say primitive) 
terms on which Hushpuppy is made a hero (and made responsible) show 
how temporal earliness remains burdened (32). Her final words not only 
point forward but also echo a frightening early scene in which she hides 
from her angry father and from the flames in her burning house in a card-
board box, drawing figures reminiscent of cave paintings and projecting 
her own future ancientness: “If Daddy kills me, I ain’t going to be forgot-
ten. I’m recording my story for the scientists in the future.” She is thus a 
curiously prehuman posthuman, figured, with her frequently misidenti-
fied gender and age, as protean and primordial. As the camera pulls away 
from the Bathtub in the film’s final scene, placing it in an increasingly dis-
tant past, Hushpuppy becomes not only meat but also future fossil, future 
petroleum, literalizing the promise of the Anthropocene (the mark of the 
human on the geological record). Rather than negating Hushpuppy’s tem-
poral earliness, we might say, a posthuman reading of the film heightens it. 
The film thus straightens out the temporal kinks of environmental address 
by relocating Hushpuppy to an end point and, in the same gesture, seeks to 
obviate the claims of innocence on race—or of race on innocence. “Our” 
belatedness no longer trumps innocence’s temporal priority; its earliness 
is simply made archaic, while the slow violence of the film’s diegesis comes 
to appear—deceptively—past.
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This recuperation of Hushpuppy’s earliness, in seeking to supersede 
the terms of “innocence,” then, is not a radical affirmation of the child or 
of childishness, or even of “meat,” but rather a refusal of her personhood. 
The posthuman reading neither leaves Hushpuppy’s innocence intact nor 
lodges the critique of innocence that we might expect: the hoary prop-
osition that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny and that children in some 
nontrivial sense are beasts. To put it another way, the film is not meaning-
fully “against survival” in Lee Edelman’s sense (2011). Rather, perpetu-
ally fathered (“with her daddy in the Bathtub”), she is made to “survive” 
precisely on another’s terms (ours). The film wants—indeed, requires—a 
responsible Hushpuppy, but it does not want a Hushpuppy who is grown 
up, or a woman, or anything other than the ambiguously gendered, pro-
tean minicreature who gets called a “man” and a “baby” and who eats like 
a beast and is food for beasts. 
What the viability of this reading reveals is the degree to which Beasts 
of the Southern Wild aims to be a film about environment and not about 
race, and not only because reviews have repeatedly noted the “multiracial” 
character of the Bathtub (Denby 2012; hooks 2012; Scott 2012). The 
posthumanist strain of this film powerfully strives to explode the catego-
ries of race, gender, age, and indeed, the human. This is not an outland-
ish strategy for environmental thinking, which, as Dipesh Chakrabarty 
(2009) among others has argued, demands a decentering of the human in 
favor of other and bigger time scales. Yet in Beasts, it is one that supersedes 
humanity only after humanity’s supposed affordances—like childhood’s 
supposed affordances, namely innocence—have already been evacuated. 
This is shadowboxing indeed. A prominent recent psychological study of 
the “dehumanization” of black children and their consequent treatment as 
adults, for example, unselfconsciously takes a humanist frame for granted, 
analyzing the damaging effects of comparing children to animals or ver-
min (Goff et al. 2014, 527–28). Beyond the familiar objection that post-
humanist gestures risk erasing categories of structural domination that 
still remain very much in operation, Beasts discloses that environmental 
representation comes with investments that are not obviously and directly 
about environment. The structure of innocence means that there are peo-
ple who don’t know, and there are people who don’t get to not know, and it 
is beyond the logic of innocence that agency lies.
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Notes
 1. Thus D. W. Winnicott’s account of “reality-testing,” which may be violent, 
forms a part of his theory of playing (1971, 15).
 2. As Kathryn Bond Stockton has argued, its only positive sign, often, is a state 
of victimhood or of weakness (Stockton 2009, 31).
 3. I wish to subordinate Beck’s ableist figure of speech to his point about repre-
sentability, which differs usefully from Nixon’s. 
 4. Sometimes this woman is interpreted as really being Hushpuppy’s mother, 
although she tells Hushpuppy, “Don’t know nothing ’bout your daddy.”
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